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Asymmetric price transmission 
in the brazilian refined sugar 
market
This work evaluates the price relations and transmis-
sion patterns between producers and retail in the mar-
ket for refined sugar in Sao Paulo, Brazil, its direction 
and magnitude. The results suggest that the transmission 
of shocks is bidirectional. Formal tests suggest that the 
symmetry in price transmission from retail to producer 
cannot be rejected in short and long-run. Therefore, 
positive and negative exogenous shocks of refined sugar 
at the retail impact producer’s prices in the same magni-
tude. From producer to retail prices, the tests confirmed 
a negative asymmetry in price transmission. It means 
that a reduction in producer prices has a stronger impact 
in reducing retail prices than when a positive shock on 
producer prices is transmitted to increase retail prices.
1. Introduction 
The dynamics of sugar prices in the Brazilian market is of particular in-
terest, considering that the country is the main producer and exporter of the 
commodity. 
Sugar is produced from sugarcane in Brazil. In the mid-1990s, the coun-
try became the greatest producer and exporter of the commodity. Since 2009 
Brazil has been responsible for more than 20 percent of the world production 
of sugar and for 60% of the total export volume. About 70% of the Brazilian 
production is directed to the external market. The domestic market is there-
fore relevant to determine the surplus that will be directed to the international 
trade. 
The work is applied to prices in the market of the state of Sao Paulo, given 
its importance on Brazilian sugar production and sugar exports. Sao Paulo has 
contributed with more than 60% of the overall Brazilian sugar production and 
has reached 70% of the countries’ exports in 2016. 
In a macro context, sugar is an important staple food product in Brazil and 
its prices affect the inflation rates. It is also an important component of the 
costs of many processed food, in particular of soft drinks.
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In general, evaluations about how price changes are transmitted between 
different market levels are relevant for players involved in production manage-
ment, marketing, as well as for policymakers. With regard to production and 
marketing, it can help the planning of operations such as inventory loading, 
freight contract timing, among other logistic and production decisions. For 
policymakers, asymmetric price transmission (APT) analysis provides infor-
mation about price dynamics in response to a specific shock, as well as de-
terminants of short-term inflation with direct consequences for monetary and 
fiscal policies (Tripathi and Goyal, 2011). In this paper, we use econometric 
tests to evaluate if there is asymmetric price transmission (APT) within the 
refined sugar chain in the state of Sao Paulo (SP). To analyze the occurrence 
of APT between, for instance, the producer’s price and retail price, we ana-
lyze how a shock in the producer’s price affects the retail price and vice-ver-
sa (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). This issue has triggered a vast 
amount of literature focusing agro-industrial markets (Aguiar and Santana, 
2002; Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Weldesenbet, 2013; Silva Neto and Parré, 
2012; Mattos, 2010; Capps and Sherwell, 2007; Santaremo and von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2016; Santaremo and Cioffi, 2010; Kim and Ward, 2013; Serra and 
Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin and Harper, 2000 Azzam, 1999; Ward, 1982) and 
also applied to fuel markets (Canêdo-Pinheiro, 2012; Goodwin, 2006; Wla-
zlowski et al., 2012). 
The empirical observation of the data seems to indicate that there is APT 
from producers to consumers. Throughout the period from May 2003 to Feb-
ruary 2015, the accumulated variation of the producer’s price was 97%, equiv-
alent to an increase of R$ 0.74 per kilogram, according to the Centro de Estu-
dos Avançados em Economia Aplicada (CEPEA) refined sugar price indicator. 
The retail data for this same product, from the Instituto de Economia Agricola 
(IEA) shows that the accumulated variation, through the same period was 
slightly higher in absolute value of R$ 0.77 per kilogram, but lower in percent-
age terms (71%). 
In addition, Rodrigues and Moraes (2007) found that consolidation of 
firms in the Brazilian refined sugar market has resulted in a relatively con-
centrated market structure due to entry barriers, such as high sunk costs with 
respect to the market size. These authors argued that despite the high market 
concentration, refined sugar producers have been unable to exploit this rela-
tive market power at the retail level. One possible explanation for that is that 
direct competition with crystal sugar produced in large scale in Brazil would 
result in high price elasticity of demand for refined sugar, such that an in-
crease in its price would result in a more than proportional reduction in con-
sumption, reducing revenue and creating opportunities for an expansion of 
crystal sugar consumption (Rodrigues and Moraes, 2007). 
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Since the 1990s, the Brazilian government deregulated the sugar and etha-
nol sector, forcing the development of self-management mechanisms. With 
this change, several adjustments became evident in the market and their prod-
ucts, fuel ethanol and sugar. This motivated an extensive literature on the eth-
anol fuel market (Barros, Bacchi and Burnquist, 2002; Alves and Bueno, 2003; 
Pontes, 2009; Serigati and Perosa, 2010; Gomez, 2010; Costa and Guilhoto, 
2011; Farina et al., 2010; Freitas and Kaneko, 2011; Cardoso and Bittencourt, 
2012; Santos, 2013). Despite the large number of studies on fuel ethanol, litera-
ture on refined sugar markets is still scarce, which justifies this analysis.
The focus on sugar in the Brazilian market is particularly interesting given 
peculiar aspects in production and in the retail market. Sugar is both depend-
ent on agricultural production and industrialization. In Brazil, it is obtained 
through an integrated vertical production chain where the major input, the 
sugarcane, is owned by the same industry that processed the cane and pro-
duced the refined sugar. In addition, the same industrialization process leads 
to the production of other types of sugar, such as crystal sugar and also 
bioethanol. This is a peculiar production setting where the input (sugarcane) 
can be allocated to produce more sugar at the expense of bioethanol and vice-
versa. Producers can therefore respond to different market conditions. 
Refined sugar in the country can be characterized as a non-perishable 
agro-industrial product with a relatively concentrated retail market. Accord-
ing to the literature, these conditions are expected to result in price increas-
es transmitted more intensively than reductions (Aguiar and Santana, 2002). 
This study will evaluate if there are other characteristics both in the produc-
tion process and market structure that should be considered in analyzes of 
price transmission for products integrated in a supply chain such as the re-
fined sugar in Brazil.
The paper presents an overview of the refined sugar market in Brazil, pro-
viding general guidelines to investigate the efficiency in transmitting mar-
ket changes to the prices. Next, a description of the concept of asymmetry in 
product and service transmission is presented and explained in terms of its 
relevance to evaluate market behavior. The methodology used for the evalua-
tion of the price transmission is described at item 4, followed by the presenta-
tion and discussion of results, finalizing with the conclusions.
2. The refined sugar market in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil
In Brazil, and specifically in the state of Sao Paulo, the sugar market is rel-
atively complex, given the diversity in the supply chain and product character-
istics. At first, there are at least eight different sugar types produced in Brazil, 
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and this situation affects the market of Sao Paulo, to which belongs the biggest 
share in the country sugar production. These different types of sugar corre-
spond to: crystal sugar, classified crystal sugar, extra-fine-crystal sugar, crystal 
sugar mesh 30, granulated crystal sugar, amorphous crystal sugar, liquid sug-
ar, inverted sugar, and raw sugar, which is classified into two categories; very 
high purity – VHP and very very high purity – VVHP (Guarani, 2015).
The amorphous refined sugar, which is this study’s focus, is produced via 
crystal sugar purification, being composed of irregular shaped fine grains, with 
excellent whiteness and extremely hygroscopic, which easily blends in drinks 
and other preparations. It is highly used for direct human consumption and 
can be an ingredient in a large number of recipes, like desserts and bread rolls. 
With the sector’s consolidation process, the number of producers de-
creased in the last decades, as highlighted by Rodrigues and Moraes (2007). 
This consolidation process has affected particularly the refined sugar market, 
selected for the empirical analysis since it provides a suitable context for test-
ing market performance with the characteristics of this commodity’s verti-
cal price transmission from producer to retail. This type of sugar is the con-
sumer’s favorite for direct consumption in the SP market, and other states of 
southeast and south Brazil as well.
Before the 1990s, government intervention in the Brazilian sugar-ethanol 
sector was relevant to explain the relation between competition through price 
and the market structure (Rodrigues and Moraes, 2007). Between 1969 and 
1974, refined sugar prices had a falling trend. In turn, an intensification of 
the market structure concentration became evident. According to Rodrigues 
(2005), in the 1970s the industry concentration ratio – CR4 was 86%, and in 
1974 it increased to 95%. Between 1975 and 1986, refined sugar prices expe-
rienced successive increases. During this period, besides the market structure 
becoming more concentrated, it suffered a slight fragmentation, mainly due to 
the entry of new mills (which used to belong to Copersucar) in isolate com-
petition in the refined sugar market. From 1986 to 1999, prices were reduced, 
leading the sector to slowly restructure itself. Sector deregulation stimulated 
some mills to include product differentiation as a goal in self-management. 
With intensified competition in the 2010s, the companies took advantage of 
the product’s good prices and made efforts to increase their market share.
Another relevant aspect in this period was the competition boost in the re-
tail market (supermarkets), despite intensified concentration in the supermar-
ket sector, when large groups with high negotiation power were opening new 
stores, certainly affecting product price levels (Barros and Claro, 2013 and 
DIEESE, 2013).
In addition to diversification of types of sugar, sugar and ethanol industri-
al units began to invest in differentiated logistics as an instrument to increase 
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competitiveness. Studies focusing on the sugar market in this period indicat-
ed that the main strategies adopted by sugar mills involved changes in busi-
ness processes and operational activities (production and logistics), improv-
ing storage agility, transport and delivery of the product (Bianchini, 2006). 
These changes involved initiatives such as association for commercialization 
(consolidated with the creation of Crystalsev), company mergers and acquisi-
tions, market diversification, just-in-time deliveries of sugar, and mills oper-
ating as trading companies (Bianchini, 2006). Rodrigues and Moraes (2007) 
emphasized the importance of identifying the evolution of market structure 
and competition level that developed throughout this process. Their study in-
dicated that the market structure of the sugar refining industry in Brazil suf-
fered from the effect of state regulation through price and trade control before 
the liberalization of the market in the 1990s.
Another important factor concerns the sector’s pricing mechanism. Since 
it is product also traded in the international market, it is expected that its 
market will be influenced by the price of refined sugar traded on the London 
Stock Exchange, as well as by the values  of sugar marketed in the internation-
al market of New York and its respective premium of polarization. Thus, it is 
believed that the sugar price formed in the foreign market – whether raw or 
white – should influence price formation in the domestic market. In addition, 
the supermarket sector identified by Rodrigues and Moraes (2007) as being 
highly concentrated, can exert power with refined sugar producers. The analy-
sis associating price level and market structure allows us to conclude that, de-
spite the State’s regulation of the product, the market structure was strongly 
related to price levels, demonstrating a positive relationship between price lev-
el and market concentration. 
3. Theoretical reference for Asymmetric price transmission (APT)
The literature about vertical price linkages has concentrated on evalua-
tions of the relation between farm, wholesale and retail prices. These relations 
are typically characterized by the magnitude, speed and nature of the adjust-
ments through the supply chain to market shocks generated at different levels 
of the marketing process (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). Recent research has rec-
ognized that underlying aspects of price transmission may cause asymmetric 
adjustments to shocks.
The literature about APT has presented several contributions for empiri-
cal analysis, with particular emphasis for agricultural products. Meyer and 
von Cramon-Taubel (2004) and Peltzman (2000) stand out for their theoreti-
cal approach, providing an interesting analytical framework about these con-
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cepts. The former presents a broad discussion about the nature and plausible 
reasons why asymmetric price transmission arises. They observe that asym-
metric price transmission can imply that consumers are not benefiting from 
a price reduction at the producers’ level, nor are producers benefitting from a 
price increase at the retail level. This, in turn, can modify the welfare effects 
across levels and among agents following shocks to a market relative to the 
case of symmetric price transmission. Peltzman (2000) considers asymmetric 
price transmission as a rule, and not exception, such that standard economic 
theory that does not take this into account might not be accurate. According 
to Peltzman (2000), consumers notice this asymmetry by the way costs are in-
corporated in the price of final goods in several markets. This perception can 
be noticed in the petrol market, for instance, where there is an intense con-
sumption frequency and an unusual price transparency in other market levels 
(Perdiguero-Garcia, 2013). 
Asymmetric price transmission (APT) has been associated with a num-
ber of reasons to explain asymmetries and imperfect pass-through of prices: 
market power, adjustment costs, inventory management, government interven-
tions, asymmetric information and perishability of the good (Aguiar and San-
tana, 2002; Santeramo and von Cramer-Taubadel, 2016). Other authors also 
consider that aspects such as high inflation scenario and use of price strategies 
(Bakucs, Falkowski and Ferto, 2013) can cause asymmetric price transmission. 
When one of these conditions occurs in the market, it is expected to reflect 
some asymmetry in price transmission. 
Borenstein Cameron and Gilbert (1997) and Perdiguero-Garcia (2013) 
show a set of reasons where asymmetry can occur in a competitive market. 
Peltzman (2000) highlights that studies focus on petrol (Karrenbrock, 1991; 
Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 1997). 
Several evaluations show that the price transmission for agricultural prod-
ucts is such that price increases are more rapid and fully transmitted than 
price decreases (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Aguiar, 1990; Karrenbrock, 1991; 
Goodwin and Harper, 2000; Kim and Ward, 2013). Additionally, various ex-
isting research has found that price changes tend to f low from the farm to 
wholesale and retail markets.
However, a generalization of these results is somewhat difficult to make, 
since there are studies that detected asymmetries in price adjustments at dif-
ferent market levels, although the extent of asymmetry is generally small. 
Azzam (1999) has demonstrated that when retailers incur in repricing 
costs, there is a range of farm price change that does not change the retail 
price. Results obtained by Goodwin and Harper (2000) confirm the findings 
of other research where the transmission of shocks appears to be unidirection-
al with information flowing up the marketing channel from farm to wholesale 
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to retail markets but not in the opposite direction. However, they have also de-
termined that farm markets do adjust to wholesale market shocks. The effects 
of retail market shocks, however, are largely confined to retail markets. In ad-
dition, minor asymmetries are present in the response of farm prices to farm 
and wholesale shocks in the earlier period. Serra and Goodwin (2003) stud-
ied price transmission between producer and retail in the Spanish dairy sector 
subject to government intervention through a system of quotas. They observed 
that price decreases were transmitted more fully than price increases. In prin-
ciple, scarcity of milk could lead to competition among processors to increase 
both their access to milk quota and their retail market share resulting in high-
er prices to producers. However, the resulting farm level price increase was not 
fully transmitted to the retail level.
An overall evaluation of the results presented in the related literature sug-
gests that these have not been conclusive regarding which factors determine 
the exact direction and magnitude of price transmission, but have resulted in 
a progressively organized framework to approach the issue. This seems to in-
dicate that there is a need to proceed to empirical analysis to identify if asym-
metries occur, as well as its nature, direction and speed. It is important, how-
ever, to use adequate procedures for the analysis.
This has generated another research line that focuses on the different esti-
mation methods to identify the characteristics of price transmissions between 
different market levels. A comprehensive review of estimating and testing 
for asymmetric price transmission can be found in Meyer and von Cramon 
Taubadel (2004).
According to Vavra and Goodwin (2005), von Cramon Taubadel and Fahl-
busch (1994) were among the first to incorporate the concept of cointegra-
tion into models of asymmetric price transmission, having suggested that in 
the case of cointegration between non-stationary time series, it becomes more 
adequate to use an error correction model (ECM) extended by incorporating 
asymmetric adjustment terms as a better procedure. This approach has been 
adopted for this analysis. 
Estimates of asymmetric price transmission using threshold error correc-
tion model are also common. Santeramo (2015) adopts this approach to pro-
vide estimates of transaction costs and speeds of price transmission among 
spatially separated markets. 
Goodwin (2006) highlights that the vertical relation among prices is fre-
quently used as an important index for structure-conduct-performance in the 
markets analyzed, or to exercise market power more directly. 
Summarizing, it is important to resort to formal tests to demonstrate the 
existence and categorize which type of asymmetry is happening. For the anal-
ysis proposed about the Brazilian refined sugar market, it is useful to classify 
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the different asymmetric price transmission types and respective causes (Mey-
er and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Thus, the possible causes of asymmetric 
price transmission, as well as a description of the econometric proceedings 
and their results are shown in this paper. 
In the refined sugar case, after these analyses, it should be possible to sug-
gest policy direction and/or strategies to improve market performance. This is 
the objective of this paper.
The basis of the price theory assumes that consumers and suppliers have 
direct interaction leading to a balance, which corresponds to the intersection 
between supply and demand slopes. Hardly ever the producer-received price is 
the same of consumer-paid prices (Tomek and Robinson, 1972), this difference 
is called marketing margin, a useful concept to highlight what must be taken 
into account to analyze the price relation among different market levels. These 
differences could arise from three sources; value-added, storage, and transport 
(Barros, 2012). Several analyses in vertical asymmetric price transmission try 
to answer questions such as: Is the marketing margin too high? Why is this 
margin not homogenous among the goods? Do margin values change over 
time? Is there any association between margin value and market structure? As 
answers based on the marketing theory were presented for these questions, the 
asymmetry in the transmission of prices came to dominate the analysis of the 
behavior of prices and margin.
For the analysis proposed, it is useful to classify the different asymmetric 
price transmission types and causes (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). 
Thus, the possible causes of asymmetric price transmission, as well as a de-
scription of the econometric proceedings and their results are shown in this 
paper. 
4. Methodology and Data
4.1 Error Correction Model
For the empirical analysis, an error correction model (ECM) basis is used 
to obtain the price transmission between two refined sugar market levels 
(producer and retail). This procedure requires the price series to be cointe-
grated, and, in this case, the ECM is preferred instead of the procedure de-
scribed by Houck (1977). Therefore, before estimating an ECM, it is necessary 
to test for cointegration and then it is useful to perform a Granger causality 
test, in order to predict the causality direction. Once the condition of coin-
tegration is satisfied, a model proposed by Von-Cramon-Taubadel and Loy 
(1999), with the modification adopted by Canêdo-Pinheiro (2012), is imple-
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mented as in equation 1, where the change in retail prices is an endogenous 
variable:
 (1)
where Δpr is the retail price variation, Δpf is the variation on the producer’s 
price, ETC is the error correction term, ε is a random error, the subscript t 
represents time and the superscript (+) and (-) indicate whether the variation 
has positive (otherwise they assume a zero value), or negative values (other-
wise, equals zero), respectively. The ETC was obtained from an auxiliary re-
gression, with their predicted residuals, i.e. ETCt = prt – δ – pft, representing a 
long-term relation between prices. In a model where price transmission occurs 
in the direction from retail to producers, one should only substitute Δpr for 
Δpf and vice versa. From equation (1) it is possible to implement the follow-
ing asymmetry tests (Pinheiro, 2012; Weldesenbet, 2013): (i) contemporaneous 
impact asymmetry (COIA), if ; (ii) distributed lag effect asymmetry 
(DLEA), if  for a j ∈ [0, max(J+,J-)]; (iii) cumulated impact asymme-
try (CUIA) until lag J, if , where j ∈ [0, min(J+,J-)];(iv) total cumu-
lated impact asymmetry (TCIA) if ; (v) equilibrium adjustment 
path asymmetry (EAPA) if θ+ ≠ θ–, i.e. if the convergence “speed” depends on 
whether the retail price is above (ETCt–1 ≥ 0) or under (ETCt–1 < 0) the long-
term price balance. All these tests can be performed as an F test. Note that 
COIA, DLEA, CUIA and TCIA test for a short-run asymmetric behavior, 
comparing the positive and negative impact of pr on pf in a given period; while 
EAPA tests for long-term asymmetry.
The Stata and Eviews softwares have been used for the model estimates 
and related econometric test. 
4.2 Data
This study used monthly price series of amorphous refined sugar paid 
to the producer and paid by the retail consumer. Both series start in May 
of 20031 and end in February of 2015. For the value paid to the producer, a 
1 The series beginning being in May of 2003 is due to the beginning of CEPEA refined 
sugar price index.
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monthly average was calculated from the daily indicator series of the Center 
for Advanced Studies in Applied Economics (CEPEA) for refined sugar prices. 
As for the retail price, it was obtained from the Institute of Agricultural Eco-
nomics (IEA) database, where the monthly price series of white sugar pack-
aged in 1kg sacks is published, which corresponds to the amorphous refined 
sugar sold in the retail market. Both price series for 1kg of refined amorphous 
sugar are presented in Figure 1. It is demonstrated that prices had a signifi-
cant rise in the period from April 2008 to April 2010. After this period, even 
if there were price changes, it is noted that these are maintained at higher lev-
els and that there is an increase in the marketing margin2, a fact that chang-
es from 2013 onwards when prices decrease. However, the price reduction is 
more intense in retail than in the producer’s level. 
Apparently, the price series shown in Figure 1 do not have fixed averages 
over time, and they also seem to share the same trajectory over time, that is, 
they have the same stochastic tendency, with cointegration between the series. 
There is also greater variation in prices in the period from the end of 2008 to 
2010. 
In Figure 2 it is possible to visually infer that both price series became sta-
tionary after the first difference.
Fig. 1. Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real at producer and retail price levels.
Figure 1 Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real at producer and retail price levels.
Source: CEPEA and IEA databases
Figure 2 Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real in first difference at producer and retail price 
level.
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2 In this case, the market margin is the difference between the retail and producers’ prices.
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Fig. 2. Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real in first difference at producer and retail price 
level.
Figure 1 Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real at producer and retail price levels.
Source: CEPEA and IEA databases
Figure 2 Refined sugar prices in Brazilian Real in first difference at producer and retail price 
level.
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Source: CEPEA and IEA databases.
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Unit root test
Within a cointegration context, the first step is to make sure that the se-
ries is non-stationary; to do this it is usual to perform some unit root tests in 
the time series. Therefore, three unit root tests were used in this analysis; the 
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS), Phillips Perron (PP) and 
Kwiatkowski, Phillps, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS). 
The results of these tests can be found in Table 1. The results indicate that 
both price series are non-stationary in level, but became stationary after the 
first differentiation, an indication that they are first order integrated.
5.2 Cointegration
With both time series being first order integrated, we can test for cointe-
gration using the Johansen test, we chose to use the third equation of the Jo-
hansen test, and the results of the tests are in Table 2. Both the trace and max-
imum eigenvalue tests indicate the presence of a cointegration vector between 
prices. This leads to the conclusion that the variables are cointegrated, which 
enables the use of error correction models. 
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Tab. 1. Unit root tests’ results.
Variables in level
No constant and trend No constant Constant and trend
Producer price
PP 0.113 -1.221 -2.239
DF - GLS - -1.255 -2.035
KPSS - 1.042 *** 0.13
Retail price
PP 0.138 -1.212 -2.048
DF - GLS - -1.26 -2.157
KPSS - 0.984 *** 0.134
Note: ***1% of statistical significance, **5% of statistical significance e *10% of statistical 
significance.
Source: authors analysis.
Tab. 2. Johansen test for cointegration results.
Test Hypothesis (n. of vectors) Trace statistics p-value   
Trace
None 27.994 0




Source: authors results and p-value by MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999).
5.3 Granger causality
Granger causality is a temporal causality, in an error-correction model 
context, causality is associated to short-term, while the causality among vari-
ables associated with error correction represents the long-term causality.
Another important aspect about Granger causality is that it is sensitive to 
the number of lags used. For this reason, tests were performed for different 
numbers of lags, in addition to the optimal number of lags found previous-
ly for the Johansen procedure. The results of the Granger causality tests are 
shown in Table 3.
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Tab. 3. Granger causality test results.
Null Hypothesis Chi² Probability Number of lags
Producer price does not 13.042 0.002 *** 2
Granger-cause 12.851 0.012 ** 4
Retail price 15.152 0.019 ** 6
15.142 0.056 * 8
Retail price does not 8.333 0.002 *** 2
 Granger-cause 8.422 0.077 * 4
Producer price 12.604 0.05 ** 6
  13.587 0.093 * 8
Note: Null hypothesis rejection at ***1%, **5% and *10% of statistical significance.
Source: author’s own calculations.
The Granger causality results indicate that there is a bi-causality between 
prices at producer and retail levels, suggesting that both respond to changes in 
each other’s prices. Thus, an exogenous change in producer prices will reflect 
in retail prices, just as an exogenous shock in retail prices will affect prices at 
the producer level. These results are important for this research by indicating 
which equations we should estimate. In the case of bi-causality, we chose to 
estimate two equations, one considering retail prices as an endogenous vari-
able and the other considering producer prices as a variable being explained 
by the lagged prices themselves and the lagged prices of consumer prices.
5.4 Error-correction model
According to the previous item’s test results, we estimate two error correc-
tion equations; one referring to the retail price response to a shock occurred 
in producer prices; another refers to the response of price shocks at the retail 
level with repercussions on producer prices. These expressions are estimated 
separately and each presents the best number of lags according to selection 
criteria (Akaike and Bayesian), and a total of 625 models were tested for each 
equation. Another relevant point to note is that, generally, when considering 
a chain that starts at the producer level and ends at the retail level, the asym-
metry in price transmission deals with downstream shocks causing upstream 
impacts. However, Barros (2012) argues that an upward change in prices may 
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impact downstream prices. This possibility has been confirmed for refined 
amorphous sugar prices and will be treated by the second equation shown in 
this section.
For asymmetric price transmission analysis of shocks occurring in produc-
er prices, here adopting the notation (pf) impacting retail prices (pr), an error 
correction model was estimated according to Equation 1, choosing the optimal 
number of lags based on the information criteria cited. This model and the re-
sults of its estimation are shown in Table 4 and are consistent with the expect-
ed, negative and significant error correction terms. Some price estimates with 
lags have negative values, which would mean that the above (below) equilib-
rium prices are expected to decrease (increase) (Weldesenbet, 2013). Another 
point to be highlighted is that the estimates of producer price parameters and 
the error correction term represent a decrease in absolute values higher than 
the values of the respective parameters referring to an increase.
Considering the estimates shown in Table 4, the asymmetry tests proposed 
in the methodology section, using the respective acronyms adopted, are per-
formed and shown in Table 5.
It should be noted that, since the model presents only one producer price 
lag, both in the case of positive and negative variations, the tests for CUIA 
and TCIA will be the same. The results shown in Table 5 indicate that the null 
hypothesis of long-term and short-term price transmission symmetry should 
be rejected at 5% and 1% of statistical significance, respectively, except for the 
short-term test of contemporary asymmetry that did not reject the hypothesis 
of symmetry. Results suggest there is asymmetry in the transmission of re-
fined sugar prices from producer to retail and that this asymmetry is negative, 
that is, decreases in producer prices reduce retail prices more intensely than 
increases in producer prices raise prices in retail.
The second equation estimated is associated with the producer price re-
sponse, due to changes in retail prices, following the same procedure as the 
previous equation, being estimated based on equation 1, but with the change 
from pr to pf and vice versa, being described in Table 6.
The asymmetry tests performed based on the results shown in Table 6 are 
shown in Table 7, where in all the four performed tests, we could not reject 
the hypothesis that there is symmetry in the transmission of prices both short 
and long terms, i.e. it is not statistically rejected that positive or negative exog-
enous shocks in the prices of refined sugar at retail impacting producer prices 
have the same magnitude.
The results for the lags of both positive and negative retail price changes 
were not statistically significant, but the same retail price changes were statis-
tically significant for the contemporary period, i.e. for period t.
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Tab. 4. Error correction model (Δpr).
Variable Estimated coefficient T statistic
Constant 0.016 1.87 *
Δp+ft 0.3 1.24
Δp+ft-1 -0.707 -2.93 ***
Δp-ft 0.741 4.8 ***
Δp-ft-1 0.225 1.21
Δp+rt-1 0.33 3.34 ***
Δp+rt-2 -0.345 -3.68 ***
Δp-rt-1 0.004 0.03
ETC+t-1 -0.205 -2.48 **








pf 1.349 55.51 ***
Note: ***1%, **5% and *10% of statistical significance.
Source: author’s analysis.
Tab. 5. Asymmetric price transmission from pr to pf.
Test acronym F statistic p-value
COIA 2.31 0.1307
DLEA (1 lag) 9.95 0.002 ***
CUIA = TCIA 13.87 0.0003 ***
EAPA 6.36 0.0129 **
Note: ***1%, **5% and *10% of statistical significance.
Source: author’s analysis.
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Tab. 6. Error correction model (Δpr).
Variable Estimated coefficient T statistic
Constant 0.003 0.46
Δp+rt 0.664 6.27 ***
Δp+rt-1 -0.081 -0.82
Δp-rt 0.42 3.51 ***
Δp-rt-1 0.064 0.52
Δp+ft-1 0.26 1.82 *
Δp-ft-1 0.316 1.8 *







  Estimated coefficient t-statistic
 
Constante 0.068 3.12 ***
pfr 0.709 55.44 ***
Note: ***1%, **5% and *10% of statistical significance.
Source: Author’s analysis.
Tab. 7. Asymmetric price transmission from pr to pf.
Test F statistic p-value
COIA 1.96 0.1639
DLEA (1 lag) 0.68 0.4125
CUIA = TCIA 0.16 0.6858
EAPA 0.79 0.377
Note: ***1%, **5% and *10% of statistical significance.
Source: Author’s analysis.
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6. Conclusions 
Several studies about agro-industrial price transmission are designed to ex-
plain why primary producers’ returns are low when consumers pay values that 
can be considered high. In this paper, we evaluated the dynamics of refined 
sugar, a staple product in the Brazilian economy, which is relevant in the defi-
nition of inflation and returns to cane producers. 
Aguiar and Santana (2002) had linked the high inflation rate, evidenced in 
Brazil before 1994, with their founds of APT for several agricultural products 
in Sao Paulo - Brazil, pointing out that a high inflation rate could have led the 
expectations of consumers to accept naturally positive APT. 
The results showed that in the refined amorphous sugar market of the state 
of Sao Paulo, changes in prices are transmitted in both directions, from pro-
ducers to retail and vice-versa. However, these transmissions occur in differ-
ent forms with regard to the asymmetry of price transmission. We could not 
reject the hypothesis that it is symmetrical when retail prices are subject to a 
shock which is passed on to the producer. The symmetry hypothesis was re-
jected, however, for shocks starting at the producer and passed on to the re-
tailer. Next, this shock transmission from producer to retail was identified as a 
negative APT. 
These results are important to better understand a relatively complex mar-
ket such as the refined sugar market in Brazil. In general, a positive asymmet-
ric behavior is expected for less perishable goods when there is market pow-
er such as monopolistic market structures. Oligopolistic structures allow for 
both, positive and negative asymmetric transmission. Therefore, the results 
are according to the related literature, since there is an increasing firm con-
centration in the supermarket sector. 
The Granger causality results indicated bi-causality of price transmission 
between producers and retailers. Since the transmission is expected to be, in 
general, from producers to retail, a possible explanation for the bi-causality 
can actually be the high concentration of supermarkets, such that the big re-
tailers negotiate and affects the price of producers. In fact, the results show 
that changes in producer prices have a larger impact on retail prices when 
these are negative. 
Another important aspect is that the negative APT was evidenced in a 
farm-retail price orientation, and some could argue that this price transmis-
sion orientation is not according to the exercise of market power by the super-
markets. However, if we consider that Granger causality, as well the symmetry 
tests performed are based on time lags only, this does not exclude the possi-
bility of a previous negotiation, where the supermarkets negotiate lower prices 
with the producers and then reduce shelve prices. 
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Kim and Ward (2013, p. 234) state that “prices higher in the vertical system 
respond quicker to rising than falling prices, again, except for the most per-
ishables.” However, there might be other situations where even non-perishable 
products respond more to price decrease than to rising prices. The study re-
sults suggest that there might be other situations where even non-perishable 
products respond more to price decrease than to rising prices. In this paper, 
the production chain under analysis is vertically integrated, such that the sug-
ar mills produce, harvest and process their own sugarcane to obtain refined 
sugar. In addition, the same industrialization process leads to the production 
of other types of sugar, such as crystal sugar and also bioethanol. In this con-
text, the negative asymmetry suggests that increasing market share is more 
important for the limited number of mills that produce refined sugar and 
which is a non-differentiated product (refiners can only resort to brands to 
differentiate their products). Therefore, they will not be willing to pass along 
cane price increases to the retail, although lower prices can be strategically ex-
plored to increase market shares. The result suggests that an increase in input 
price might be compensated in the markets of other co-products of the sug-
arcane sector, where the prevailing market conditions are more competitive, 
such as bioethanol and crystal sugar.  
From a consumer perspective, since sugar is a staple food product that af-
fects inflation, the evidence that positive shocks on producer prices will be 
passed on to consumers less intensely than negative shocks suggests that there 
is no need to policy intervention in the short-run. In addition, there seems to 
be reasons to expect that reduction in taxes levied upon sugarcane producers, 
both direct and indirect, would be passed on to the retail level, benefiting fi-
nal consumers. 
A problem that might evolve through time, however, and to which policy-
makers should be aware, is regarding the progression of competition for in-
creasing market share at the retail level. As a high concentration is reached by 
few retailers, a change in price transmission behavior could be expected such 
that price increases would be explored in a sufficiently concentrated market. 
As previously highlighted herein and in the related literature, the method-
ology used does not enable to identify the reasons that explain what has actu-
ally occurred. However, others plausible explanations to be proven by future 
analyses can include the following: (i) being a product of the Brazilian staple 
food, refined sugar presents a more inelastic demand than its supply, hence a 
tax exemption on retail prices may result in a greater drop in prices charged 
by retailers than those by producers; (ii) the change of habits of Brazilians and 
campaigns against refined sugar consumption (these explanations, (i) and (ii), 
are not complementary); (iii) the increase in concentration and competition 
of retailers over the period of the analysis may have caused a decline in re-
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fined sugar prices to the consumer; (iv) as a strategy to increase market con-
centration, it may have occurred the reverse of the most expected price be-
havior when there is abuse of market power, in an alternative to that raised 
in item (i), i.e. if it would be valid that the demand for refined sugar is not 
so inelastic as assumed in the argument above; (v) another possibility is that 
it has become more elastic over time, given a likely increase in the supply of 
competing products, such as ground crystal sugar, which has a lower pro-
duction cost; (vi) an increase in the consumption of foods with higher added 
value that use other types of sugars in detriment of foods made at home that 
use refined amorphous sugar, and even the reduction of its consumption due 
to campaigns to reduce consumption of this type of sweetener, such as cam-
paigns for type 2 diabetes prevention, such as in (ii). Thus, suggestions for fu-
ture research would be to verify the evolution of the price elasticity of demand 
for refined sugar in Brazil and especially in south-central regions, where this 
type of sugar is most consumed, in order to validate possible explanations for 
price shock behavior. 
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